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I. Introduction  
In its totality , the NCAA makes up 1,117 colleges and universities, over 100 athletic 
conferences, with 40 affiliated sports organizations.1 Their motto: prioritizing academics, well-
being and fairness so college athletes can succeed on the field, in the classroom and for life.2 Not 
surprisingly, each Division has their own set of rules, called bylaws.3 Member representatives are 
appointed and serve on committees within the NCAA and are responsible for proposing rules and 
policies within the realm of college athletics.4 It is the members who ultimately decide which rules 
will officially be adopted.5 These rules include everything from recruiting and compliance, to 
academics and championships.6 The NCAA national office consists of 500 employees located at 
the Indianapolis headquarters whose job is to “interpret and support member legislation,” run 
championships, and manage programs designed to benefit student athletes.7 
The NCAA is composed of bylaws that are separated by division.8 Specifically, the 
Division I manual, effective August 1, 2018, constitutes a 440-page manual of rules and 
regulations.9 The bylaws are for all student athletes (those returning), and all new student athletes 
(those signing the Student-Athlete Statement for the first time).10 The bylaws lay out of rules and 
regulations for all student-athlete participation and conduct.11 Specifics of the bylaws include: 
ethical conduct, amateurism, financial aid, academic standards, regulations concerning eligibility, 
outside competition, transferring, recruitment, and more.12 
The focus of this Note will surround Bylaw 14: Academic Eligibility. As a general 
overview, a student-athlete is not permitted to compete in intercollegiate athletics competition 
unless all applicable eligibility requirements are met.13 Specifically, this Note will discuss the 
litigation surrounding Bylaw 14.5: Transfer Regulations. In general, “a student who transfers to a 
member institution from any collegiate institution is required to complete one full academic year 
of residence at the certifying institution before being eligible to compete for…the member 
institution, unless the student…qualifies for an exception as set forth in this bylaw.”14 
Additionally, a transfer student from a four-year institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate 
competition at a member institution until the student has fulfilled a residence requirement of one 
                                                          
1 What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter What is the NCAA?] 
2 Our Priorities, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
3 Membership, NCAA, http:// www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter 
Membership]. 
4 Historical Outline of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-
are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification (last visited Jan. 30. 2019). 
[hereinafter Historical Outline] 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 What is the NCAA?, supra note 1. 
8 Membership, supra note 3. 
9 NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL: AUGUST 2018-19 (2018), https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4547-2018-
2019-ncaa-division-i-manual-august-version-available-august-2018.aspx [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL]. 
10 Id. 
11 See generally id. 
12 Id. 
13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, § 14.01.1 
14 Id. at § 14.5.1 
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full academic year at the certifying institution.15 The litigation surrounding this Note stems from 
Bylaw 14.5.5.2.10: One-Time Transfer Exception. This bylaw states: “the student transfers to the 
certifying institution from another four-year collegiate institution, and all of the following 
conditions are met: 
 
(a) The student is a participant in a sport other than baseball, basketball, bowl 
subdivision football or men’s ice hockey at the institution to which the student is 
transferring…16 
(b) The student has not transferred previously from one four-year institution…17 
(c) At the time of transfer to the certifying institution (see Bylaw 14.5.2), the student 
would have been academically eligible had he or she remained at the institution 
from which the student transferred…18 
(d) If the student is transferring from an NCAA or NAIA member institution, the 
student’s previous institution shall certify in writing that it has no objection to the 
student being granted an exception to the transfer-residence requirement. If an 
institution receives a written request for a release from a student-athlete, the 
institution shall grant or deny the request within seven business days. If the 
institution fails to respond to the student-athlete’s written request within seven 
business days, the release shall be granted by default and the institution shall 
provide a written release to the student-athlete.19 
 
The purpose of this rule is to prevent student-athletes participating in revenue-generating 
sports (basketball, football, baseball, and men’s hockey) from participating in NCAA competition 
at a new Division I member institution without first completing a full academic year. The only 
exception to this rule would be if a student athlete participating in one of these sports received a 
waiver, as found from Bylaw 14.7. The Committee on Academics may waive academic and 
general eligibility requirements under the following circumstances: 
 
(a) For student-athletes in times of national emergency; 
(b) For member institutions that have instituted a trimester or other accelerated 
academic program, provided any member institution applying for a waiver shall 
demonstrate a reasonable need for such waiver.20  
                                                          
15 Id. at § 14.5.5 
16 “…A participant in championship subdivision football at the institution to which the student is transferring may 
use this exception only if the participant transferred to the certifying institution from an institution that sponsors 
bowl subdivision football and has two or more seasons of competition remaining in football or the participant 
transfers from a Football Championship Subdivision institution that offers athletically related financial aid in 
football to a Football Championship Subdivision institution that does not offer athletically related financial aid in 
football;” 
17 “…unless, in the previous transfer, the student-athlete received an exception per Bylaw 14.5.5.2.6 
(discontinued/nonsponsored sport exception);” 
18 “…except that he or she is not required to have fulfilled the necessary percentage-of-degree requirements at the 
previous institution; and” 
19 Id. at § 14.5.5.2.10(a)-(d) 
20 Further, no waiver shall be granted that permits a student-athlete to compete in more than the maximum 
permissible number of seasons of intercollegiate competition (see Bylaw 12.8). Under the waiver allowed, if a 
student in an accelerated academic program completes the requirements for a degree before completing eligibility, 
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(c) For institutions that have suffered extraordinary personnel losses from one or 
more of their intercollegiate athletics teams due to accident or illness of a disastrous 
nature21 
 
 This Note will discuss the litigation surrounding the current transfer process and analyze 
the judicial holdings’ impact on all current student-athletes, regardless of sport. First, this Note 
will begin with a brief background of the NCAA’s structural foundation and its divisional makeup. 
It is important to understand that the current transfer restrictions apply to Division I student athletes 
only. Next, it will shift into a case analysis regarding each pivotal case the NCAA has ever faced, 
beginning in 1984. All challenges are brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act, and this Note will 
discuss how an antitrust act made its way into college athletic bylaws. The ultimate conclusion is 
that the whereas some NCAA bylaws may be subjected to Sherman antitrust scrutiny, the transfer 
bylaws have, and will continue to, remain unaffected.  
Moreover, this Note will discuss how the judicial holdings, in accordance with the NCAA 
transfer bylaws, in fact, protect student athletes, instead of cause harm. If the transfer rule were to 
be lifted, the current NCAA structure could be forever changed as we know, and that may not be 
in the best interests of the student athletes. The NCAA transfer bylaw seeks to protect amateurism, 
as continually held by the courts, which is exactly why the NCAA was created in the first place. 
From there, this Note will discuss alternate options for student-athletes seeking to transfer across 
Division I member institutions and the most recent reform the NCAA has taken in response to the 
current call for action. Lastly, this Note will conclude with a finding that a college education is 
priceless, and how the NCAA transfer regulations seek to protect that notion. 
 
A. Background 
 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was formed in 1906 with the 
purpose to create competition and eligibility rules for intercollegiate sports.22 In the 1905 season, 
football was in danger of being abolished as it was deemed too dangerous.23 During this season, 
18 college and amateur players died during play.24 As a result, President Theodore Roosevelt 
summoned thirteen football representatives to the White House to participate in meetings with the 
focus on reform to improve safety.25 The NCAA was officially formed shortly thereafter on the 
curtail of this safety agreement.26 From there, discussions transitioned into the preservation of 
amateurism alongside the notion of allowing college athletes to obtain a scholarship in exchange 
to represent the school in their respective sport.27 
                                                          
the student may participate in competition that begins within 90 days after completion of the requirements for the 
degree; and 
21 Id. at § 14.7.1(a)-(c) 
22 National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-CollegiateAthletic-Association (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). [hereinafter 
National Collegiate Athletic Association] 
23 Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, Huffpost (Dec. 7. 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/johnny-
manziel-ncaa-eligibility_b_3020985 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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Today, the NCAA serves as a general legislative and administrative authority for men’s 
and women’s intercollegiate athletics.28 It creates and enforces the rules of play for every sport.29 
It creates eligibility requirement for student athletes.30 It supervises not only national, but regional 
intercollegiate athletic contests.31 It complies statistics on about a dozen college sports, including: 
gridiron football, baseball, men’s and women’s basketball, soccer, ice hockey, and lacrosse.32 It 
publishes rule books and guides on each and every sport.33 In the early 21st century, NCAA 
member institutions include more than 1,000 college and universities.34 
Since 1973, the NCAA has structured into a multiclass organizational system; with the 
three classes divided into Division I, Division II, and Division III athletics.35 These institutions 
must meet minimum and maximum financial aid awards in each sport for their athletics 
programs.36 The NCAA reorganization structure was approved in 1973 at the first Special 
Convention for competition and legislative purposes.37 The President of the NCAA, at the time 
Dr. Alan Chapman, said that “reorganization was vital to keep the association a valuable force in 
athletics.”38 He felt that the organizations were drifting apart due to the vastly differing opinions 
between the large and small schools.39 “No longer will the big guys be telling the little guys what 
to do…”40 Whereas the divisions represent an organizational hierarchy, a Division II or Division 
III institution may elect to participate in any one Division I sport.41 However, this is limited to any 
sport that is not football or basketball.42 
One of the main goals of the NCAA is to serve college student-athletes.43 They accomplish 
this goal via academic services, opportunities and experiences, financial assistance, wellness and 
insurance, and professional and personal development.44 No matter what division a student-athlete 
may participate in, the NCAA serves to support and advance each and every individual.45 
Specifically, more than eight in ten Division I student-athletes earn bachelor’s degrees.46 This 
number constitutes their highest rate ever and higher than the general student body.47 If the judicial 
system were to holding that any NCAA student athlete could transfer at any time, it could lead to 
                                                          
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-CollegiateAthletic-Association (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
36 Id. 
37 Historical Outline of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-
are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification (last visited Jan. 30. 2019). 
[hereinafter Historical Outline] 
38 Gordon S. White Jr. N.C.A.A. Reorganizes Into 3 Groups, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 1973), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/08/07/archives/ncaa-reorganizes-into-3-groups-national-league-standing-of-the.html 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Historical Outline, supra note 20. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Student-Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
47 Id. 
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a situation where students would begin to transfer mid-semester. Credits may not necessarily 
properly transfer across intuitions, forcing students to repeat classes or adding on an additional 
semester. Before long, a student athlete could no longer be athletically eligible, have a semester 
remaining, but no scholarship to cover the cost. 
 
B. The Sherman Antitrust Act 
 
Since 1984, every single lawsuit against the NCAA challenging the enforceability of its bylaws 
has been brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Act”). The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 
stemming from the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.48 The Act 
was originally enacted to facilitate competition and prevent monopolies in major industrial and 
agricultural industries.49 Over time, the Sherman Act grew to ensure a competitive free market 
system and has expanded over all differing types of industries in the United States.50 Lawsuits 
against the NCAA for violation of the Sherman Act have stemmed from Section 1: 
 
“1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one 
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundered thousand 
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, 
in the discretion of the court.” 
 
In the context of the NCAA, the Sherman Act serves to promote and protect against 
competition.  In the realm of sports law, this Act has been the predominant mean applied to effect 
change in NCAA sanctioned sports. The main issue surrounding each legal claim is whether the 
actions of the NCAA violate the antitrust laws. As this Note will discuss, the NCAA transfer rule 
will not be subjected to the Act’s antitrust scrutiny as it is exempt from such analysis. Therefore, 
so long as an NCAA bylaw is presumptively competitive, it will been be seen as a protection of 
amateurism. 
 
II. Case Analysis 
 
 Since 1984, the NCAA has seen a handful of pivotal cases challenging the enforceability 
of its bylaws. Whereas the judicial system has not upheld each and every single bylaw as 
competitive, to withstand the Act’s scrutiny, it has deemed a narrow set of circumstances where 
the NCAA is essentially untouchable. So long as the NCAA proves that their bylaws conform to 
preserving the tradition of amateurism, it will withstand the Act. 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, http://economics.fundamentalfinance.com/sherman-act.php (February 2, 
2019). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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A. 1984: The First Challenge to the NCAA  
 
 This was the year the Supreme Court came out with their decision regarding the first 
Sherman Act challenge to the NCAA in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma 
and the University of Georgia Athletic Association51 Board of Regents was the first time the 
NCAA had ever been attacked via antitrust liability. Whereas the Supreme Court ultimately ruled 
the NCAA’s monopoly on football television broadcasting violated the Sherman Act52, it was the 
dicta of Justice Stevens that would go on to be cited in numerous future cases and leave a true 
lasting impact that came to change the NCAA forever.  
The relevant facts of the case are as follows. In 1981, the NCAA created a television plan 
for the college football games of its member institutions for the 1982-1985 seasons.53 The intention 
of the plan was to reduce the adverse effect of live television upon football game attendance.54 
This plan limited the total amount of televised intercollegiate football games and subsequently, the 
number of games that any one college could televise.55 No member of the NCAA was permitted 
to make any sales of television rights except in accordance with the plan.56 The NCAA contracted 
with two outside television networks granting them each the right the telecast the live “exposures” 
described in the plan. In return, each network agreed to pay a specified fee to the participating 
NCAA members.57  
Respondent members, as additionally part of the NCAA member-institutions, were 
members of the College Football Association (CFA), which was created to promote the interests 
of football colleges within the NCAA.58 The CFA had negotiated their own contract with a 
different network that would have allowed more television appearances than the NCAA plan for 
each college, and subsequently increased CFA revenues.59 
In response, the NCAA warned they would take disciplinary action against any CFA 
member that complied with their television plan.60 Respondents then commenced legal action in 
the Federal District Court.61 The District Court held that the controls exercised by the NCAA over 
television the college football games violation Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and 
accordingly granted injunctive relief.62 The court found that competition in the live college football 
television market had been restrained in three ways: (1) the NCAA fixed the price for particular 
telecasts; (2) its exclusive network contracts were tantamount to a group boycott of all other 
potential broadcasters and its threat of sanctions against its members constituted a threatened 
boycott of potential competitors; and (3) its plan placed an artificial limit on the production of 
televised college football.63  
                                                          
51 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
52 See generally id. 
53 Id. at 2995. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 2952. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 2957. 
63 Id. 
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The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court’s holding.64 They found that the Sherman 
Act had been violated and the NCAA’s plan constituted “illegal per se price fixing” and that even 
if it were not per se illegal, the anticompetitive limitation on output and price was justified by any 
procompetitive defenses.65 In a 7-2 holding, authored by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court 
reversed the judgement of the Court of Appeals and directed them to vacate the District Court’s 
injunction pending further proceedings in accordance with the substantial remaining authority of 
the NCAA to regulate the telecasting of its member institutions’ football games.66  
The Court found that the NCAA member institutions created an unreasonable type of 
restraint via a horizontal agreement among members as the way in which they competed with one 
another.67 It created an artificial limit on the amount of football games to be televised which created 
a limitation on output.68 In addition, there was horizontal price fixing because the minimum 
aggregate price precludes any price negotiations between institutions and broadcasters.69 As a 
matter of law, this is considered to be “illegal per se” because these practices are anticompetitive.70 
However, the Court did not use the “per se” approach in their analysis because this particular case 
involves a specific industry where horizontal restraints are essential to be available in the first 
place.71 Instead, the Court’s analysis falls under the Rule of Reason to determine the impact of 
competitive conditions under the horizontal structure.72 Analysis under the Sherman Act in 
accordance with the Rule of Reason does not change the ultimate inquiry focus as its purpose is to 
analyze the competitive significance of the restraint. 
Even under the Rule of Reason analysis, the Court still concluded that the NCAA’s 
restraints on price and output had significant anticompetitive effects.73 As previously stated by the 
District Court, if the member institutions were unrestrained from selling television rights, it was 
determined that more games would be shown on television at a lower price.74 By the NCAA fixing 
the price for television rights, it created a structure that was unreceptive to viewer demands.75 Not 
to mention, since all member institutions needed NCAA approval, no member institution had a 
real choice but to comply with the NCAA plan or face hefty sanctions.76 The combination of all 
these points created an anticompetitive market where individual competitors essentially lost their 
right to compete. 
Whereas the Supreme Court ultimately held that the NCAA’s conduct violated the 
Sherman Act as it represented an unreasonable restraint of trade, it is the dicta of the Court’s 
holding that would resonate for years to come via their “twinkling of an eye” analysis discussed 
in future litigation. The Court found that most of the regulatory NCAA controls are justifiable to 
foster competition among amateur athletics, and “therefore procompetitive because they enhance 
public interest in intercollegiate athletics,” while ultimately concluding that the NCAA television 
plan is not in the same realm as “rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of 
                                                          
64 Id. at 2958. 
65 Id. 
66 See generally id. 
67 Id. at 2958-59. 
68 Id. at 2959. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See generally id. 
72 See generally id. 
73 Id. at 2959. 
74 Id. at 2962. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 2969. 
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participants, or the manner in which members of a joint enterprise share the responsibilities and 
the benefits of the total venture.”77 This would come to serve as extremely important language in 
future litigation because Justice Stevens essentially paved the road for all future bylaws to be 
exempt from Sherman Act anticompetitive liability. 
In the last section of the opinion, Justice Stevens concludes that the NCAA plays a “critical 
role” in the maintenance of tradition and amateurism in intercollegiate athletics, and that it needs 
“ample latitude” to play that role.78 This vital language would come to serve as the pathway for 
the NCAA to create and enforce any such type of bylaw of their choosing, so long as the output is 
not restricted. Justice Stevens, along with six other members of the Supreme Court, felt that it was 
the NCAA’s role to “preserve a tradition that might otherwise die.”79 
The NCAA was founded on the preservation of amateur athletics.80 This theory of 
responsibility has allowed the Association to create a set of rules and twist them into whatever 
form they deem fit. As long as amateurism is protected, and the bylaws are deemed procompetitive, 
the NCAA has withstood any sort of scrutiny that has come its way. 
 
B. The Difficulty of Proving an Anticompetitive Effect 
 
 The burden of proving that a given bylaw produces an anticompetitive effect on the stated 
market rests with the plaintiff. As seen in Board of Regents, this is no easy feat to overcome. In 
Agnew v. NCAA81 the plaintiffs failed to keep their claim alive past a motion to dismiss. 
 Plaintiffs, Agnew and Courtney, underwent similar undergraduate experiences regarding 
athletic scholarship award receivals. Both were awarded scholarships for a year of education, 
room, and board at no charge, in exchange for playing football at their respective colleges.82 After 
the first year, both suffered serious injuries that prevented them from having their scholarships 
renewed for the entirety of their degree progression.83 They jointly filed a lawsuit alleging their 
failure to acquire a scholarship to the full cost of obtaining a Bachelor degree was a direct result 
of the NCAA’s bylaws prohibiting specific member schools from offering multi-year scholarships, 
or capping the number of athletic scholarships a school can offer for each team in a given year.84 
 In 2011, the District Court granted the NCAA’s motion to dismiss holding that the plaintiffs 
failed to identify a cognizable market for which trade was improperly restrained, and even if done, 
that those markets were not cognizable under the Sherman Act.85 The District Court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.86 Plaintiffs appealed this decision to dismiss its claims and its 
decision to dismiss with prejudice.87 
 The Seventh Circuit began their opinion with reiterating that the NCAA bylaw analysis 
must be done under the Rule of Reason, where the plaintiff carries the burden of showing the 
                                                          
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 2970. 
79 Id. 
80 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 at 2978. 
81 Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). 
82 Id. at 322. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 333. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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anticompetitive effect on a given market.88 This court interprets Justice Stevens’ dicta in Board of 
Regents to mean that most NCAA regulations will be a “justifiable means of fostering competition 
among amateur teams,” and are therefore procompetitive.89 The Court considers these types of 
regulations to have been “blessed by the Supreme Court” and therefore exempt from Sherman Act 
liability.90 In the context of the case at hand, the Court finds that the regulations at issue are exactly 
those types of regulations that Justice Stevens addressed in his Board of Regents opinion.91 For the 
preceding reasons, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
claims with prejudice.92 
 As demonstrated by Agnew, if bylaws surrounding athletic scholarship renewals will not 
sustain Sherman Antitrust Act scrutiny, what will? Whereas the Agnew court felt they conformed 
in accordance with Justice Stevens’ dicta in Board of Regents, the following Ninth Circuit court 
case opened the pathway to the future of NCAA bylaws and questioned whether, in totality, they 
are actually procompetitive in nature. 
 
C. How to Obtain Any Relief 
 
 At the time, O’Bannon v. NCAA93 was seen as a ground-breaking case for Sherman 
Antitrust Act challenges towards the NCAA. It gave a sense of hope for student athletes who felt 
harmed and seemed to open the pathway for future litigation challenges. 
Plaintiff, Ed O’Bannon was a former All-American basketball player at UCLA.94 One day 
in 2008, he was at a friend’s house where he was informed by the friend’s son that he had been 
depicted in a college basketball video game produced by Electronic Arts (“EA”).95 In the game, 
the avatar that O’Bannon saw was a virtual depiction of himself and wore his same jersey 
number.96 O’Bannon never agreed to have EA use his likeness for the video game and received 
zero compensation for it.97 In 2009, O’Bannon sued the NCAA and Collegiate Licensing Company 
(“CLC”) on the ground that the NCAA’s amateurism rules prevented himself, and other student-
athletes, from being compensated for the use of their names, images, and likeness (“NILs”).98 
 After a fourteen-day bench trial, the District Court entered judgement for O’Bannon, 
holding that the NCAA disallowing student athlete’s to be compensated for their NILs violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.99 The Court applied the Rule of Reason to analyze the legality of 
the challenged NCAA rules and found they posed an anticompetitive effect in the college education 
market.100 These rules allow colleges and universities to value a player’s NILs at zero, effectively 
colluding to fix the price.101 However, when applying the second step of the Rule of Reason, the 
                                                          
88 Id. at 335. 
89 Id. at 339. 
90 Id. at 341. 
91 See generally id. 
92 Id. at 328. 
93 O’Bannon v. National College Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
94 Id. at 1055. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1056. 
100 Id. at 1057. 
101 Id. at 1058. 
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Court found amateurism serves two procompetitive purpose.102 The first, integrating academics 
and athletics to “improve the quality of educational services” provided, and second by promoting 
the understanding of amateurism, to help preserve consumer demand for college sports.103 In the 
third and final prong in the Rule of Reason analysis, the Court considered whether there were 
means of achieving the NCAA’s procompetitive purposes that were “substantially less restrictive” 
than a total ban on compensating student athletes for the usage of their NILs.104 To this point, the 
District Court found that student athletes could be paid by their institutions up to the cost of 
attendance, and up to $5,000 per year to be put in a trust and paid when they leave school.105 
 The Ninth Circuit begins by discussing the Board of Regents dicta regarding amateurism. 
In O’Bannon, the NCAA makes the argument that amateurism is exempt from Sherman Act 
liability and cite the Board of Regents.106 However, the Ninth Circuit disagrees with this 
contention, in that Board of Regents did not exempt amateurism from liability, it was only offered 
a deference of Rule of Reason analysis because the nature (“character and quality”) of the NCAA 
requires a less strict scrutiny; but is by no means exempt. The Court deems that the validity of 
amateurism rules must be “proved, not presumed.”107 
 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit vacates the lower court’s holding an injunction requiring the 
NCAA to allow their member institutions to compensate student-athletes up to $5,000 per year in 
deferred compensation.108 They found that the District Court ignored the fact that not paying 
student athletes is “precisely what makes them amateurs,” which is an integral factor to the NCAA 
market.109 The Ninth Circuit otherwise affirmed the lower court’s holding.110  
 Whereas the O’Bannon holding did not quite provide the relief various student athletes 
have desperately been seeking, it opened the pathway to for future litigation that NCAA bylaws 
are not automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny, and a proper analysis must be performed 
before any bylaw can be deemed procompetitive under the NCAA model. 
 
III. Transfer Challenges to the NCAA 
 
In search for a new means to challenge the NCAA bylaws as anticompetitive under the 
Sherman Act, three separate lawsuits were violated between November 2015 and November 2016. 
Each were class-action lawsuits challenging the NCAA transfer bylaw, all filed by the same firm: 
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. Each complaint alleges that the Year in Residence Rule acts 
as an illegal restrain on trade under the Sherman Act. Two of the three lawsuits have been litigated, 
with one having reached a Seventh Circuit opinion in summer 2018. Both of which, the courts 
ruled in favor of the NCAA. The last case was awaiting the Seventh Circuit decision before taking 
further action. 
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A. Initiation of the Year-In-Transfer Bylaw Movement 
 
 As harm-felt student athletes watched their fellow colleagues rise and fall in the judicial 
system, a particular law firm saw a hole in the movement. Transfer bylaws had never been brought 
to the courts under Sherman Antitrust Act liability, and the issue was ripe for hearing. Although 
all lawsuits were filed between 2015 and 2016, the transfer issue had been going on long before 
Hagens Berman filed its first suit in Pugh v. NCAA.111 
In 2010, Pugh accepted a full ride scholarship to a Division I FCS school, Weber State 
University, on the promise by head coach, Ron McBride, that his scholarship would be renewed 
annually as long as he did well academically and remained eligible for NCAA competition.112 In 
December 2011, Coach McBride retired and the new head coach, Jody Sears, informed Pugh that 
Weber state would not be renewing his scholarship and he should look into transferring.113 Pugh 
had offers from multiple D1 schools, so long as he would apply and be granted a NCAA “hardship 
waiver” allowing him to play immediately.114 The NCAA ultimately denied his request and every 
scholarship offer Pugh received was rescinded.115 In 2013, Pugh transferred to a Division II school 
where he was eligible to compete immediately.116 His scholarship was not a full ride, causing Pugh 
to have to take out loans.117 
 In his lawsuit against the NCAA, Pugh argues that the NCAA transfer bylaws violate the 
Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint of trade, specifically focusing on the “year in residence” 
requirement.118 
 The Court focuses on the Supreme Court opinion of Board of Regents and the Seventh 
Circuit opinion of Agnew, to frame their decision in granting the NCAA’s motion to dismiss on 
Count II regarding the year-in-residence bylaw. When analyzing Pugh’s motion to dismiss, the 
Court focuses on whether the transfer rule is deemed “presumptively procompetitive” or not.119 
The transfer bylaw directly relates to eligibility, to which the Court held that “the law is clear” and 
NCAA eligibility bylaws, in accordance with Board of Regents, is presumptively procompetitive 
and therefore, does not violate the Sherman Act.120  
Pugh argues that the transfer bylaw does not involve a challenge affecting eligibility, but 
instead, the distribution of scholarships, to which the Court found unpersuasive.121 Additionally, 
the court found Pugh’s second argument that he was economically harmed by having to take a 
diminished scholarship at his new school to also be unconvincing.122 Even if the court decided to 
view Pugh’s harm as a commercial challenge, the Court would nonetheless be required to examine 
the NCAA’s activities, instead of Pugh’s. Since it is the duty of the NCAA to maintain a tradition 
of amateurism in college sports, the court is required to give them “ample latitude”123  
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana chose to conform their 
opinion directly within the decisions in Agnew and Board of Regents, and not to conduct any 
additional thought or analysis. 
 
 B. Try, and Try Again 
 
 Shortly after attorney Hagens Berman filed the Pugh lawsuit, he filed another suit in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana124 with the exact same issue in 
Deppe v. NCAA125 Deppe was recruited to play football as a punter by six different Division I 
universities, and ultimately chose Northern Illinois University (“NIU”) where he enrolled in June 
2014 as a preferred walk-on. Deppe “red shirted” his first year, meaning he chose to forego one 
year of athletic eligibility, to carry over to a later year.126 He planned to start the following year as 
the team’s punter and then have four years of athletic eligibility remaining.127 He was told by the 
special team’s coach that he would be receiving an athletic scholarship in January 2015.128 
However, that coach left NIU prior to September 2015, when Deppe received office letters of 
release.129  
 Deppe then began recruiting with other schools immediately.130 He visited the University 
of Iowa (“Iowa”), and during his visit, the coaching staff told him they wanted him if he would be 
eligible for the 2016/17 season, via a hardship waiver.131 In November 2015, Iowa accepted Deppe 
into their institution for admission.132 However, days later, the Iowa coach informed Deppe that 
their program had decided to pursue another punter who had immediate academic eligibility, 
instead of pursuing an NCAA waiver.133 Deppe’s attorneys contact the NCAA inquiring if he could 
still receive a waiver given the circumstances but was ultimately denied because only the transfer 
institution can request a waiver in accordance with NCAA rules.134 
 Deppe filed a complaint with this Court claiming that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act 
by (1) limiting the number of Division I football scholarships that a member institution can grant 
in a given year; and (2) promulgating a “year-in-residency” bylaw that (with exceptions) requires 
Division I student athletes to forego a year of athletic eligibility when they transfer to another 
Division I school.135 His second count alleges that the transfer bylaws also violate the transfer 
Sherman Act as an unreasonable restrain on trade.136 
 The Seventh Circuit ultimately affirms the District Court’s holding that the year-in-
residence rule is a presumptively procompetitive eligibility in accordance with Agnew and Board 
of Regents, and found a full Rule of Reason analysis to be unnecessary.137 A procompetitive 
presumption will not be warranted if a regulation does not preserve a tradition of amateurism. The 
                                                          
124 No. 1:16-CV-00528, 2016 U.S. Dist. (S.D. Ind. Mar. 8, 2016). 
125 Deppe v. National College Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018). 
126 Id. at 499. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 499-500. 
131 Id. at 500. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See generally id.   
 DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1  
 
 
36 
Seventh Circuit cites to Board of Regents explanation that most, if not all, NCAA eligibility rules 
will within the presumption of pro-competitiveness.138 Deppe argues that the year-in-residence 
rule does not fit within traditional eligibility bylaws; however, the Court disagrees and holds that 
the rule “falls neatly in line” with other rules previous courts have characterized as eligibility 
rules.139 
 Deppe next makes the argument that the NCAA enforces the transfer rule for economic 
reasons and not to preserve the product of college football.140 In shaping this argument, he notes 
that the transfer exception is unavailable to revenue-generating sports within the NCAA.141 
However, the Court explains that Deppe ignores the fact that these are “precisely the athletes who 
are most vulnerable to poaching,” and lifting these restrictions would allow institutions to 
essentially trade these student athletes like professional athletes.142 
 In the second part of this argument, Deppe contends administrative costs like recruiting 
and retention expenditures are lowered by impeding the transfer schools.143 He states that member 
institutions are essentially saving money that they would otherwise need to spend on larger 
scholarships to tempt their student-athletes to stay, as long as additional funds necessary to recruit 
and train new players to replace the ones that leave.144 The Court shuts down this argument finding 
that saving money as a consequence of an eligibility bylaw does not correlate to the presumption 
that such bylaw is “fundamentally aimed at containing costs” ahead of preserving amateurism in 
such sports.145 
 The last economic argument that Deppe makes is that the year-in-residence rule “preserves 
the hegemony of the ‘Power 5’ conferences.”146 He makes the assertion that these schools recruit 
the most talented high-school athletes and the transfer rule prevents those athletes from transferring 
to less powerful schools.147 The Court strikes this notion down because it believes that the rule 
impedes transfer in both directions because without the rule, the Power 5 schools could poach 
athletes from smaller schools, which would “risk eroding the amateur character of college 
games.”148 
 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found the year-in-transfer rule presumptively 
procompetitive on its face in accordance with Agnew and Board of Regents, forwent a full Rule of 
Reason analysis, and held that Deppe’s challenge of the NCAA year-in-residence bylaw under the 
Sherman Act failed on the pleadings. 
  
C. Accept Defeat and Re-Strategize  
 
The third, and final, lawsuit filed in federal court was by plaintiff, Johnnie Vassar 
(“Vassar”).149 Vassar is a former men’s basketball player at Northwestern University who filed a 
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class-action lawsuit against Northwestern and the NCAA alleging that the two collaborated to “run 
him off” the team to free up his scholarship for another player.150 According to his complaint filed 
in the Northern District of Illinois, he alleges that Northwestern put him on an internship to work 
as a janitor and that head coach, Chris Collins, “berated” him and told him that he had no future 
with the team.151 Collins had no comment to the Northwestern daily newspaper, only stating that 
he would “let those things be handled behind closed doors.”152 
 According to the complaint, Vassar was placed in an internship in attempt to get him to 
give up his athletic scholarship.153 He was required to report at 7 a.m. multiple days per week 
picking up trash and leaves, operating a leaf blower, wiping down tennis court bleachers and 
baseball diamonds, and to life heavy metal planks near the football field.154 To make matters worse, 
the complaint alleges that Northwestern attempted to falsify his timecards attempting to prove 
misconduct on Vassar’s part.155 
 In 2016, Vassar was allegedly (informally) asked in March 2016 if he would take a cash 
payment that was to be equal to the remainder value of his current scholarship.156 Following, he 
voiced concerns over the NCAA rules and was then asked if he would be willing to accept an equal 
scholarship based off of merit.157 One month later, Vasser was notified that the University would 
be revoking his scholarship.158 
 The class-action lawsuit, like the others, alleges that the NCAA violated the Sherman 
antitrust law by requiring student-athletes to sit out for one year after transferring to another 
institution.159 While Vassar remained a student at Northwestern, he reached out to multiple 
Division I basketball programs inquiring about transferring but was ultimately informed that he 
would not be accepted unless he could play immediately.160 University spokesman Al Cubbage 
told the school newspaper, via email, that he believed the claim had no legal merit, and that he 
would “vigorously” defend the University.161 
 Vasser chose to await the summer 2018 Deppe decision in the Seventh Circuit before 
deciding whether he intended to further along the litigation process.162 Following the decision, in 
August 2018, Vasser dropped his suit from federal court and re-filed a similar version of the 
lawsuit in Cook County circuit court, now solely against the University.163 Prior to the Deppe 
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decision, the judge presiding over the Vassar case had repeatedly continued the NCAA’s motion 
to dismiss.164 According to Vassar’s legal counsel, the choice to withdraw the lawsuit surrounded 
the fact that “the appeal was unlikely to survive.”165 Vassar graduated from Northwestern and has 
since enrolled as a graduate program at Tennessee Tech and plays on the men’s Division 1 
basketball team.166 In accordance with the NCAA bylaws, graduate students do not have to sit out 
one year before becoming eligible.167 
 In the original federal lawsuit, Vassar alleges that he was “berated” by Coach Collins and 
placed in an “internship” that entailed manual labor.168 The new re-filed lawsuit in Cook County 
court, alleges the exact same facts and description of events, but presents nine causes of action 
instead of four.169 Vassar’s lawyers stated that the additional state law complaints include claims 
such as ‘Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,’ and ‘Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress,” that were not applicable in the federal court system.170 Northwestern’s legal counsel 
stated that the University will comply with the court rules and procedures, and “will defend those 
claims aggressively” because he believes they are without merit.171 In accordance with the Cook 
County civil suit docket, as of March 2018, the case has yet to be set for trial.172 
 
IV. Analysis 
 
In light of the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Deppe, one must ask: did the Court get it 
right? As a matter of public policy, do we, as a society, want to prevent willing and able student-
athletes in revenue-general to be able to freely transfer across member institutions? On the one 
hand, why should these individuals be prohibited from doing as they please? However, on the 
other, are there greater repercussions at stake if such a transfer would be allowed? Is it really about 
protecting amateurism? The answers to these questions will never be found in the judicial system.  
The next step is to face the harsh reality and accept that the judicial system has placed its 
proverbial foot down and put the transfer issue to rest once and for all. They have made it crystal 
clear that so long as the NCAA bylaws seek to protect amateurism, they will be subjected to Rule 
of Reason analysis, and found to be competitive and not in violation of the Sherman Act. Like 
Vasser, those feeling incomplete by this decision have the option to seek alternate damages in state 
court, if applicable, or look to the current change happening in the NCAA for relief. 
 It is easy to make the argument that the year-in-transfer bylaw should be outlawed, and the 
NCAA should restructure their bylaws to be more student-athlete friendly and allow athletes to 
freely transfer whenever they choose. However, the better argument is that the year-in-transfer 
bylaw serves a dual purpose on both sides of the spectrum. First, the NCAA and member 
institutions win because this rule ensures that athletes cannot jump from conference to conference, 
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hindering large TV contracts and conference cash flow. Second, it protects what is most important 
at the end of the day: the value of a college degree. Student-athletes make the decision to attend 
college for the purpose of obtaining a degree, with athletics serving as a means to an end within a 
co-dependent relationship.  
There is no doubt that certain athletic situations put a student-athlete in a position where 
they no longer feel that their current program best suits their needs, but recent litigation 
surrounding this exact issue has made an impact on the NCAA and forced them to alter their 
transfer process for the better. This next section will discuss how the year-in-transfer bylaw 
financially serves the NCAA and member institutions, and transitions into how the transfer process 
has been reformed for the better. Lastly, this section will conclude with how recent litigation, 
combined with NCAA reform, ultimately ensures that student-athletes are protected and will be 
set up to graduate with success. 
 
A. At the End of the Day, It’s All About the Money  
 
  It comes as no surprise that the majority of NCAA revenue comes from the Division 1 
men’s basketball television and marketing rights.173 In 2017, the NCAA made $1 billion in revenue 
from “media rights fees, ticket sales, corporate sponsorships, and a proliferation of television ads” 
surrounding the March tournament.174 The remainder revenue comes from championship ticket 
sales, and other small variety of sources, such as membership dues. From there, $164.7 million is 
distributed amongst Division 1 conferences via a “Division 1 Basketball Performance Fund,” (the 
Fund) based on their performance in the men’s basketball tournament over a six-year rolling 
period.175 Then, that money is distributed further down to fund individual sports and provide 
additional athletic scholarships.176 This would be impossible without the student-athlete.  
 If a student-athlete in a revenue-generating sport, specifically men’s basketball, were able 
to transfer at any time without having to miss one game, television contracts would be adversely 
affected. Sporting networks would be unable to make firm deals with conferences as they would 
have no assurance on a conference’s popularity. Conferences athletic ability would be fluid, 
therefore, resulting in lower-costing television contracts for a shorter amount of time. Since the 
money that comes from the Fund is distributed by conference, it would be impossible to accurately 
allocate the money across conferences if athletes were able to transfer mid-season. Conferences 
would be constantly changing, and it would become more difficult to accurately measure 
distribution from the Fund. 
 The NCAA encourages conferences to divide their money equally among the members.177 
This is easier for larger conferences to do as they have other sources of income.178 However, 
smaller conferences count on this NCAA money to cover their own expenses.179 It is only the 
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leftover money that actually gets distributed to the conference members.180 Most universities do 
not even make money on their basketball programs, and only about one-third will break even.181 
Therefore, by allowing players to actively transfer schools, and across conferences, it shrinks the 
pot of money that gets distributed to each institution. 
 Less money per institution, means less money per athlete. There is an illustrious hype about 
the “glamorous” student-athlete life: the free trips, free meals, free clothing. However, none of this 
would be possible without those student-athletes in revenue-generating sports. Not to mention, 
most student athletes who are not participants of a revenue-generating sports, do not lead 
glamorous lives to say the least. They practice 40+ hours per week182 and compete just as 
frequently, if not more, than those participating in a revenue-generating sport, with far less of a 
budget. The second that conferences are making less money, is the same second that the student-
athletes at the bottom of the totem pole will suffer. It may begin with less clothing, no big deal. 
However, in the next minute it could mean not being able to afford travel to competition, or less 
money per meal while on the road. In the blink of an eye, student-athletes will second guess 
whether they actually want to subject themselves to such a lifestyle, and college athletics as we 
know it will be transformed forever. 
 Everyone views the NCAA as a money-grubbing institution that squeezes everything they 
can out of an athlete to make a profit.183 However, student-athletes choose this life. They choose 
to commit four (or more) years to an institution, to serve a greater purpose. This relationship is co-
dependent as after this time is up, they walk out of the door with a college degree. The more money 
that the NCAA makes is more money than gets allocated to the student-athlete, especially those 
athletes whose sports sit at the bottom of the totem pole. By allowing athletes to get up and change 
institutions at any point, would result in less money per conference, and subsequently, less money 
per athlete.   
 
B. Changes to the Transfer Process 
 
 Under the previous transfer regime, a student-athlete must first notify his or her school 
prior to transferring.184 From there, the school may block the student-athlete from having any 
contact with any or all other schools.185 Specifically, big time basketball and football programs 
sought to block their student-athletes from contact with other conference institutions.186 As of June 
2018, the NCAA Division 1 counsel approved a proposal that switched the transferring profess to 
a “notification-of-transfer” system in order to bring transparency and open conversation.187 
                                                          
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Peter Jacobs, Here's The Insane Amount Of Time Student-Athletes Spend On Practice (January 27, 2015) 
https://www.businessinsider.com/college-student-athletes-spend-40-hours-a-week-practicing-2015-1 [hereinafter 
Here’s The Insane Amount of Time] 
183 Doug Robinson, Opinion: NCAA Business Model Is Broken (March 2018) 
https://www.athleticbusiness.com/college/opinion-ncaa-business-model-is-broken.html 
184 Austin Nivison, NCAA makes major change to transfer, redshirt rules (June 13, 2018) 
https://247sports.com/Article/NCAA-adopts-major-change-to-transfer-process-redshirt-rule-119018996/ 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 New transfer rule eliminates permission-to-contact process, NCAA, 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-transfer-rule-eliminates-permission-contact-process 
(last visited March 18, 2019). 
 DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1  
 
 
41 
Beginning in October 2018, student-athletes finally obtained the ability to transfer without asking 
for permission.188  
Under this new system, once the student-athlete informs his or her school of their desire to 
transfer, the school is then required to enter that student’s name into a national transfer database 
within two business days.189 Once in the database, other coaches are free to contact that particular 
individual.190 This rule change prevents the practice of coaches and/or administrators from 
preventing student-athletes from having contact with specific schools. However, conferences still 
maintain the ability to make rules that may be more restrictive than the national rule.191 Tampering 
with a student-athlete’s transfer is no considered a “significant breach of conduct,” Level 2 
violation.192 This rule change officially took effect on October 15, 2018.193 According to the 
NCAA, the Transfer Working Group is still continuing to work on other transfer issues and is “still 
exploring the possibility” of uniform transfer rules.194 
Although this rule change may not be the solution every transferee seeks, it is one step in 
the right direction. It means that the NCAA acknowledges that there is a very real problem in 
practice and is taking active steps to right the wrong. Hopefully this rule will discourage shady 
recruiting and coaching practices, and force universities to incentivize their student-athletes to 
remain at their institution until graduation. 
 
C. Reform in Action 
 
 The 2018 high-profile reform to the transfer bylaws made major strides for student-athletes, 
falling short of creating a “free agency” in college sports.195 The new transfer profess can be seen 
as a modification, and ultimately, a compromise, clearing the way for a smoother transition 
between universities and maybe ultimately paving the way for immediate competition 
eligibility.196 
 According to NCAA vice President, Dave Schnase, “the membership wanted to put 
immediate eligibility back on the table,” with the circumstances of each individual case essentially 
dictating the approval rate.197 Immediate eligibility for all transfers was allegedly considered, but 
ultimately not included in the reform.198 Before the change, immediate undergraduate eligibility 
was only granted when a school could show “extremely egregious behavior” by the previous 
school.199 Other than that, all the NCAA could do was tack on an additional year of eligibility at 
the end of a college career.200 Now, a request for immediate eligibility can be granted if the transfer 
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was “due to documented mitigating circumstances that are outside the student-athlete’s control 
and directly impact [their] health, safety, and well-being.”201 
 Michigan quarterback, Shea Patterson, is the first well-publicized case to undergo the new 
guidelines, as he transferred to Michigan after Mississippi received NCAA sanctions.202 Patterson 
alleges that he and his teammates were misled about the scope of an NCAA investigation into Ole 
Miss, and the Revels’ bowl ban fell under the mitigating circumstances category.203 He worked 
with attorney Tom Mars on his waiver, who believes the waiver change seems to have been a 
positive step in the right direction by the NCAA.204 Mars believes that this new rule allowing 
mitigating circumstances instead of egregious behavior has encouraged universities to settle 
matters without the previous institution having to admit any type of wrongdoing.205 He believes it 
to be a more collaborative approach surrounding waiver requests, resulting in more positive 
outcomes for student-athletes.206 
 Mars has also worked with quarterback transfer, Justin Fields, who was the victim of 
several racial slurs directed at him during a game in October while he was playing for Georgia.207 
Fields made the argument that he feared for his own well-being as a student-athlete, which is a 
mitigating circumstance outside of his control.208 However, in general, the NCAA and member 
institutions do not publicly explain waiver decisions citing to student privacy laws.209 
 
D. Statistical Analysis  
 
 Between April 1 and November 9, 2018, the transfer waiver approval rate was 66% across 
all sports.210 This was down from the 2017-18 school year, which was at 83%.211 However, waivers 
requested before April 1, 2018, included those that requested an extra year of eligibility, not just 
the immediate eligibility option.212 
 NCAA Division 1 data since the change is as follows: 63 of football players requested 
waivers and 50 were approved, at 79%; and 55 men’s basketball players requested waivers and 33 
were approved, at 60%.213 Patterson and Fields were not the only highly publicized players granted 
waivers for immediate eligibility.214 Other cases drew attention as well, including Demetris 
Robertson, who is a receiver from California allowed to play immediately at Georgia, and Antonio 
Williams, who is a running back transferring from Ohio State to North Carolina.215 Whereas more 
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requests for immediate eligibility have been granted, since each request is different, it is too soon 
and too difficult to determine whether the reform can be deemed a success or not as of yet. 
 
E. Alternate Waivers and Exceptions 
 
 Whereas the judicial system has made it clear the NCAA is the master of their bylaws, 
without wiggle room, student-athletes should always look for alternate means to seek immediate 
eligibility. The one-time exception is the most commonly used exception for transfers from one 
four-year Division 1 university to another.216 A student-athlete should always look for another 
transfer exception to use. However, although such an exception may have fewer requirements, it 
may not always be the better option. As discussed above, all three plaintiffs would not have had 
any issue transferring had they been granted waivers, and thereafter would have been able to 
continue to pursue a college degree via a collegiate sporting career. The various additional waivers 
and exceptions include: graduate exception, graduate transfer waiver, discontinued academic 
program exception, military service exception, discontinued/non-sponsored sport exception, two-
year non-participation/minimal participation exception, return to original institution without 
participation or with minimal participation exception, and non-recruited student exception.217 
 The most controversial exception to the year-in-transfer rule is the family hardship 
waiver.218 Student-athletes participating in basketball and football programs that are granted this 
waiver, are except from the year-in-transfer rule and are eligible to play their sport immediately.219 
However, the reason this waiver is so controversial is that whether one is granted or denied is 
extremely inconsistent.220 To be eligible for this transfer, the student-athlete must make the 
argument that the best thing for the athlete and his or her family, is to allow the athlete to play 
immediately and that the athlete needs this transfer to assist with an injured or ill family member.221 
In accordance, the NCAA measures three areas: (1) the nature of the injury or illness; (2) the 
student-athlete’s responsibilities related to the care of the family member; and (3) the chronology 
of events.222 
 First, the injury or illness alleged must be life threatening and must involve and immediate 
family member.223 Waivers will typically be denied if involving an extended family member, such 
as an aunt/uncle, or grandparent; unless it can be proved that the particular family member raised 
the student-athlete.224 Second, the more involved the student athlete is with the day-to-day care for 
that immediate family member, the more likely it is that the waiver will be granted.225 Last, there 
must be something that changed to have prompted the student-athletes transfer.226 Examples 
include a diagnosis, the actual injury, or a worsening condition.227 Waivers are much less likely to 
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be granted if a family member has been ill or injured for a while, or if nothing has changed that 
requires the student-athlete to transfer.228 
 The university must request the waiver and must submit at least three sets of information 
coming from the student-athlete/family: (1) documentation from the doctor who diagnosed the 
injured or ill family member; (2) documentation from the doctor currently treating the family 
member; and (3) a letter from the student-athlete explaining the need for a waiver.229 
  Additional examples include: (applied to any sport) a student-athlete may transfer and play 
immediately, if their academic program was discontinued and they enroll in the same major that 
they were studying at the previous institution.230 A student-athlete may also transfer and play 
immediately if he or she was not recruited in accordance with the NCAA, never received an athletic 
scholarship, and did not practice or compete other than a tryout.231 Lastly, a student-athlete may 
transfer and play immediately if the previous school publicly announced that it will drop the 
student-athlete’s sport, will reclassify to another division, or the school never sponsored the 
student-athlete’s sport.232 Unfortunately, most of these exceptions and waivers are applied to 
extreme and unlikely circumstances.233 
 
F. The Bottom Line 
 
 Since its birth, the NCAA has virtually been able to act however it wants and has withstood 
countless protection from the judicial system under the blanket of “preserving amateurism.” 
However, at the end of the day, student-athletes need to be prepared for a life after college, and by 
the courts upholding the year-in-residence rule, it creates a lasting impact affecting more than just 
any particular plaintiff. By not allowing student athletes from revenue-generating sports to freely 
transfer, or be traded like a professional athlete, it protects the entirety of their education. 
 In Division 1 athletes there are approximately 179,200 student-athletes across 351 NCAA 
member institutions.234 59% of all student-athletes will received some type of scholarship or 
academic aid during their athletic tenure.235 In 2017, the graduation success rate was 87%. Fewer 
than 2% of NCAA student-athletes will go on to be a professional athlete.236 The fact is, most 
student-athletes depend on their academics to prepare them for the harsh reality that is life after 
college. Not only is an education important, it is absolutely vital. The courts want to preserve 
amateurism and protect student-athletes from being free trade. Some may ask: what is actually 
being protected if student-athletes cannot move around at their own will? The answer: their 
education. 
 Officially, in season practice is restricted to 20 hours per week (or four hours per day) in 
accordance with NCAA rules.237 However, many student-athletes have reported that they spend at 
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least 30 hours per week practicing, with up to 40 hours including weekly practice commitments; 
according to a 2011 NCAA survey cited in the UNC lawsuit.238 The 20-hour per week rule may 
be what the NCAA officially purports to follow but is not what is actually seen in practice. Student-
led workouts do not count towards the 20 hours, neither do administrative meetings, film study, 
athletic training and rehab, nor any other “activity” where a coach is not present. Game days count 
as three hours, but some competitions extend far beyond the three-hour mark.239 For example, 
track and field meets can last up to eight hours in one particular day, with meets lasting for two or 
three days. 
 This begs the question: what is the NCAA doing for student-athlete education and career 
development? Bylaw 16.3 covers “Academic and Other Support Services” with approximately 
three sub-sections.240 16.3.1, titled “Mandatory,” outlines general academic counseling and 
tutoring services available to all student-athletes.241 However, such services “may be provided” in 
athletic departments but are not required.242 If the NCAA valued the “student” portion as much as 
the “athletic” portion of the name, then these services would be mandatory. The NCAA needs to 
prove that they value the student-athlete as a whole. The NCAA should require that athletes 
mandatorily check in with their advisors for academic counseling and support, especially when an 
athlete is in season. The student-athlete is serving the institution through athletic participation and 
competition; therefore, the institution should be serving the student right back. 
 The NCAA brags via a 2016 Gallup study that interviewed 1,670 former student-athletes 
about their college experiences and currently well-being, that former student-athletes rated higher 
than 23,000 non-student-athletes graduating from the same institutions.243 Five elements were 
measured: purpose, social, community, physical well-being, and financial-well-being.244 Of those 
give, former student-athletes rated higher in all except financial well-being, where former student-
athletes were thriving at similar levels in comparison to non-student-athlete peers.245 Among these 
statistics, women stood out versus non-student athletes in employment rate and workplace 
engagement.246 Additionally, men who played football or basketball scored higher in purpose and 
community well-being.247 While these numbers appear promising, it must be noted that career 
services are not required by the NCAA.248 Considering there are upwards for 200,000249 Division 
I student-athletes alone, per year, these numbers from the Gallup poll must be taken with a grain 
of salt. 
 Given these facts, what the NCAA does do right is prevent student athletes in revenue-
generating sports from freely transferring without having to sit out one year. Valuing education is 
likely not the reason why this rule is in place, although the court system claims it is protecting 
student athletes from free trade, this bylaw does serve a useful purpose. If student athletes did not 
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have to sit out a year, they would be free to transfer at any point. This “any point” could mean 
mid-semester. Basketball players would be enticed to transfer around mid-March right before the 
NCAA tournament to a team that they feel is more likely to win. The repercussion of this transfer 
would be a total and complete hindering of the student-athlete’s education. Transferring can be 
difficult and stressful in and of itself, but breaking up an education has a lasting impact that could 
negatively affect their future. How would credits properly transfer over? What if credits were 
missed due to the new school’s academic policies? This could result in a student athlete having to 
tack on an additional semester to graduate resulting in the loss of a potential job opportunity post-
graduation.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The long, anticipated wait from the 7th Circuit holding is over. The NCAA year-in-transfer 
bylaw will continue to be upheld by the courts in an effort to preserve amateurism. What does this 
mean for future student athletes looking to transfer from their current schools? First, it means 
current high school athletes seeking to play in a Division 1 revenue generating sport should make 
a careful and cautious decision. Recruiting techniques have been exposed and serve to educate the 
youth on what they may be getting into when deciding what institution to attend. As for current 
student-athletes, this ruling means that they need to pursue alternate transfer means. With hardship 
waivers being seemingly easier to attain, if a student-athlete truly feels there are “mitigating 
circumstances” preventing them from staying at their school, they can pursue a waiver to play their 
sport. At the end of the day, college athletics serve as a means to an end: a college degree. 
Preserving the NCAA transfer rule will have a lasting impact on student athletes, it protects them 
from being bounced around like a professional athlete, and allow them to obtain a unhindered 
college education while simultaneously competing in a sport they love.  
 
 
 
 
